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I. Introduction: The Context of the Verdross-Spann Association
This article is a part of a section of the European Journal concerned with the
international law thought of Alfred Verdross. It deals specifically with the inter-war
period leading up to the German occupation of Austria and Verdross's temporary
suspension from Vienna University in the years 1938-39. Given his relations with
National Socialism, the difficult question arises whether some of his writings of this
time1 represent firmly held views or whether they mark a bowing to difficult
circumstances. Controversy surrounds this period of Verdross's life and work. It is
readily admitted in circles close to him that he did accommodate to Nazi pressure.
However,, such sentiments are usually accompanied by the feeling and hope that a
cloud will descend on this period and that the past will be decently forgotten. It is
obvious from the October 1994 Austrian elections that nationalist traditions are not
so easily made to vanish.
So it is thought worthwhile to explore some neglected parts of Verdross's inter-
war writings and his political activities leading up to 1938. It will be argued that
there is a continuity in one aspect of his work from 1918 to 1938 which requires that
it be taken seriously as firmly held and clearly thought out opinion. Verdross
adhered to a form of all-German nationalism which fits into a particular romantic
idealist tradition. He was influenced at least in part by the work of Othmar Spann. In
his relations with the Nazis he identified his position as nationalist. There is no
doubt but that Verdross thought he could work with National Socialists but the
evidence considered here2 does not indicate that he identified with it. In particular
* University of Derby.
1 Especially the 1937 edition of Volkerrecht (Springer) Berlin.
2 The writer has had no access to private papers and, in keeping with the remit of the contribution to
the European Journal, no account is taken of post-war (i.e. 1945) assessments of Verdross.
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the records available, mainly Nazi police archives,3 show that his scholarly work
and academic and political activity were all closely scrutinized, leading to the firm
conclusion that Verdross was not of their society, albeit he could hardly be accused
of being in opposition to them. This article can merely hope to open up rather than
to conclude debate as to whether German nationalism, and in particular the variety
espoused by Verdross, has been irreparably compromised by the catastrophic and
outrageous development and conclusion of the Third Reich.
Alfred Verdross was a German-Austrian intellectual and not simply a technical
international lawyer during the 1920s and 1930s. As a diplomat of the German-
Austrian Republic in Berlin in 1919 he wrote a substantial argument for the
immediate Anschluss of Austria to Germany, pleading, inter alia, that all German
speakers, including those living in the Sudetenland and the South Tyrol, should be
part of a single Germany. The overthrow of dynasties should also favour the freely
expressed wishes of the German peoples to form one State.4 In the same spirit
Verdross wrote a very critical contribution to a volume on the South Tyrol for die
Vienna University Institute for Minority Peoples.5 Verdross pointed to a speech of
US President Wilson that the Italian boundary should follow the lines of nationality,
and felt that the language boundary between Italian and German was very clear.6 He
considered the rights of South Tyrol violated by the disregard of Wilson's
undertaking. The Versailles Treaty was illegal (volkerrechtswidrig) in so far as it
violated the Wilson Points. It was a question of when rather than whether it would
be appropriate to ensure the means to restore the rights of South Tyrol.7
No attempt is made to consider Verdross's behaviour and the attitudes of others towards him after
1945. This would have to be the subject of another entire article.
Verdross, 'Deutsch-Osterreich in GroB-Deutschland', in C. Haussmann (ed.), 7 DerAufbau (with a
foreword by L.M. Hartmann) (1919). What follows is a summary of the article. The concept of
Austria-Hungary was used by the upholders of a Klein-Deutschland to suppress 40 million non-
Germans in the Empire (at 15-16). The Grofi-Deutschland solution for Austria simply meant that
the Habsburgs and Hohenzollerns could no longer divide the Germans in Austria who could then
vote for the grofideutsche solution (at 19). This represented a putting into practice, in the case of
the Germans, of the principle of the French Revolution that every nation had the right of self-
determination to form a State of its own, without having the right to dominate any other State (at
31-32). The right of self-determination that each nation must build its own State means: '... Staat
und Nation gehoren untrennbar zusammen, da die Nation die naturliche Verbindung der Menschen
bildet Sie ist zusammengeschmiedet dutch das Gefuhl der ZusammengehSrigkeit; die Einheit der
Nation beruht daher nicht auf Gewalt und Eroberung, wie es bei den historisch gewordenen Staaten
der Fall ist, sondem auf dem Recht der Selbstbestimmung...' (at 32).
'Deutschsudtirol', Drei Vortrage von Voltelini, Verdross, Winkler, in W. Winkler (ed.), Schriften
des Institutes fur Statistik der Minderheitsvdlker an der Universitat Wien, Vol. 5 (1926).
Ibid., at 5. After a complex discussion as to whether Austria could benefit from an Allied
commitment to Germany to conclude peace on the basis of Wilson's 14 Points (at 6-7), Verdross
notes that the Allies decided to implement a commitment to Italy, on the basis of which it entered
the war, to give it the Brenner Pass border with Austria (at 7-8). Verdross then considers Italian
government undertakings to respect German minority rights in South Tyrol and, in his view, the
systematic violation of these rights, especially after Mussolini came to power (at 9 et seq.).
Ibid., at 24-26. Nothing was to be expected of the mechanisms afforded by the League of Nations.
Verdross speaks of 'saving' South Tyrol. His paper appears mainly concerned with guaranteeing
basic minority group rights, at 25.
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In the 1930s Verdross's All-German (gesamtdeutsch) nationalism came with a
sympathy for National Socialists, particularly students, in the years 1934-38. This
subject has been considered by Oliver Rathkolb in his study of the Vienna Law
Faculty,8 which has received no written response from the Faculty since its
publication. In the course of investigations of Verdross conducted by Nazi
authorities during the period of his suspension after March 1938, he himself
presented a statement for the attention of the Reichskommissar for the Reunification
of Austria with Germany. It is entitled: 'The National-political and National-legal
(nationalrechtliche) Activities of Univ. Prof. Dr. A. Verdross'. The statement lists
his collaboration with NS circles in his desire to favour All-German
(gesamtdeutsche) views. He cites among his publications the 1919 piece already
discussed and numerous other short pieces on the question of Anschluss, the Sudeten
Germans and minority rights. Verdross himself stressed his support of National
Socialist students, all of which served, in his view, to demonstrate his nationalist
stance.9
All of this suggests that Verdross's association with National Socialism was not
a short-lived, purely opportunistic or otherwise 'weak' bowing or bending to
circumstances. The apparently cursory approval of National Socialism in the 1937
textbook, Volkerrecht10 is rooted in a deep commitment to German nationalism.
When he was reinstated to teach again in the spring of 1939 he undertook regularly
the general introduction to the study of law under the title Volk und Stoat.u In the
textbook (Volkerrecht (1937)), under the rubric Volk und Stoat (Volkerrechtliche
Grundbegriffe) he presented a firmly nationalist perspective which is a consistent
development of the ideas in the 1919 article. There are three elements in his
doctrine. The individual man exists only as a member of a people;12 the goal of a
peaceful international order is to ensure that each people is able to build its own
8 Rathkolb, 'Die Rechts- und Staatswissenschaftliche Fakultat der Universitat Wien zwischen
Antisemitismus, Deutschnationalismus und Nationalsozialismus 1938, davor und danach', in G.
Heiss etaL, WillfOhrige Wissenschaft (1989) 197 esp. 217-219.
9 Gauakt No. 259658, Osterreichisches Staatsarchiv, Bericht Ober Alfred von Verdross.
10 A. Verdross, Vdlkerrecht, supra note 1, at 29. In his statement to the Reichskommissar {.Gauakt,
supra note 9) Verdross cites several critical reviews of this work. In Vdlkerbund und VStkerrecht a
leading NS international lawyer, G.A. Walz, praises the work as '... eine veikerrechtswissen-
schaftliche Gesamtschau vom deutschen Standpunkt...' (emphasized by Verdross). The Berlin
Journal Kulturwehr (1938) at 60 states that the book is already the most widely recommended in
German universities. Verdross underlines the review's favourable remarks about his objective
treatment of nationality as a concept, avoiding the liberal subjectivism of French approaches to the
topic. Once again Verdross emphasizes the characterization of the book as 'das bedeutendste
deutsche Lehrbuch des VSlkerrechts...' Consistently Verdross stresses his commitment to German
nationalism and does not try to present himself as a National Socialist.
11 See the official Vienna University Vorlesungsverzeichnis from the Wintersemester 1939-40 until
the Wintersemester 1944-45.
12 VSlkerrecht, supra note 1, at 39: '... Wir haben schon fruher darauf hingewiesen, daB es keine
Menschen an sich, sondem nur Menschen bestimmter Art gibt. Die hfichste natiirliche menschliche
Art bildet das Volkstum; daher gehSrt jeder Mensch einem bestimmten Volkstum an...'
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State;13 and it is the State and the international legal order's function to serve the
well-being of peoples, and not vice versa.14 This is the background against which
Verdross would have undertaken in the 3rd Trimester of 1940 a course entitled Der
Neuaufbau Europas im Lichte des Volkerrechts (The Rebuilding of Europe in the
Perspective of International Law).15
In other words, during the whole period of the 1920s and 30s Verdross's
intellectual stance and convictions were clear and did not change. How he chose to
present himself after 1945 is another matter and is not the subject of this article.
Instead the concern is, without the benefit of hindsight, to investigate what exactly
he himself understood by nationalism and how he understood it to be compatible
with some version of National Socialism. In the space at present allocated, and in
the absence of access to private papers, a beginning will be made by exploring the
intellectual affinities between Verdross and Othmar Spann. Spann was a colleague
in the Vienna Law Faculty who has a reputation as a leading nationalist theorist of
the inter-war period, interested in collaboration with National Socialism, but
removed in 1938 by the Nazis, never to be reinstated. Given the very extensive
research on Spann's close, but eventually very troubled relations with the Nazis, it is
particularly interesting to explore the intellectual relationship between the two
against a background of scholarship where the ambiguities of Spann's position have
been extensively highlighted. This experience can only help in assessing possible
ambiguities in Verdross's position.16
That is to say it will not be attempted in this short article to give a systematic
account of the entire content of Verdross's 1937 textbook. This was undertaken in
1939 by Ernst Engelberg in an article published in France.17 This very critical piece
highlights Verdross's engagement for an international law of peoples (un droit des
peuples) and stresses that Verdross attached to this framework the pre-1914 doctrine
of the droits fondamentaux of States, thereby radically subjectivizing international
law and destabilizing it by relying on a doctrine of absolute State sovereignty.18
Engelberg's critique cites the work of Bristler19 but it puts forward the speculative
argument that the reason Verdross combines these two sets of ideas is to give free
rein to an arbitrary and expansive NS foreign policy.20 The object of the present
article is not to refute this general argument but to begin scholarly analysis of
13 Ibid., at 40, citing Augustine stating that God chose to allow the variety of peoples and languages
to persist and '... daB es fur den Frieden der Welt am besten bestellt ware, wenn jede 'gens' ihren
eigenen Staat bilden wiirde...'
14 Ibid, at 41: "... ist die Idee des Staates auf das Volk ruckbezogen, da es seine Aufgabe ist, das Volk
zu schiitzen und zu vervollkommen... Da aber die Staaten nur auBere Organisationen lebendiger
Volker sind, steht auch das Vfilkerrecht letztlich im Dienste dieser...'
15 See the Vorlesungsverzeichnis of Vienna Urnversity for 1940.
16 See A. Mohler, Die /Conservative Revolution in Deutschland 1918-1932. Ein Handbuch (4th ed.,
1994) 413, and Erganzungsband, 58.
17 "Les bases ideologiques de la nouvelle conception de droit international de M. Alfred von
Verdross', 46 RGDIP (1939) 37-52.
18 Ibid., at 39 and 44.
19 Die Vollcerrechtslehre des Nationalsozialismus (1938) at 42 of Engelberg's text.
20 Ibid.
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Verdross's work during this period by examining as closely as possible the
metaphysical foundation he gives to an international law of peoples.
II. The Concept of Relationship in Spann's Social Theory
Spann developed an integrationalist and/or organic theory of the relationship of the
individual to community, of which his theory of law, State and society was part.
Some introduction to these basic ideas is necessary, if only to give some general
orientation as to how Verdross could see them as applicable to international law.
Later, some of the 'ambiguities' in Spann's thought can be returned to. The two
words (integrationalist, organic) refer to the idea that all relationships should be in
some sense essential, necessary, thereby implying a mutual boundedness, making
separation incompatible with continued independent existence. Spann was far from
denying that the Volk (people) is also bound within a community of Menschheit
(mankind). Rather it is the nature of this relationship which needs to be explored. He
sees it as transforming so utterly individual identity that it makes no sense to think
of individuals outside relationship. A favourite expression of Spann was 'Selbstsein
durch Sein im anderen'.21 This is within a romantic tradition in the sense that great
importance is attached to the personal, emotion, feeling, etc. Thus, Spann's view of
relationship is of a direct (unmittelbar) meeting of hearts in which separate identity
is transformed rather than lost22
On the first page of the introduction to Die Einheit des rechtlichen Weltbildes23
Verdross remarks that after completion of his manuscript (1923) the second edition
of Othmar Spann's Gesellschaftslehre (also 1923) came to his attention. This he
regards as the first serious attempt to present State and law as different parts of
society as a whole. Spann is accredited with denying the dominant doctrine that law
is created by the State, in favour of the phenomenological approach that the State
should be seen as a unity of action while the law is a unity of values. He mentions
Spann again later in the same text in quite general terms but, nonetheless, in terms
which are central to Verdross. The 16th century Spanish school of international law,
for instance Vitoria, recognized the State as integrally and necessarily part of an
international order, while the modern school of positivism sees the State as free to
choose whether to bind itself 'externally' and 'accidentally' to international law.
The relationship is not essential (wesensnotwendig), so that the State can leave it at
will. In contrast, the old doctrine is that States and international law stand, in their
21 O. Spann, Gesamtausgabe Vol. 4, Gesellschaftslehre (Social Theory), (W. Heinrich and others
(ed.), 1969, reproducing the 3rd edition of 1930) 144: '... der menschliche Ceist hat nicht
Einzelheit sondem Gezweiung ... ohne Sein im Andern kann der menschliche Geist ebensowenig
ein Selbst sein ... wie man ohne Wind segeln kann...'
22 Ibid., at 147: '... Der andere Geist, das Du, das uns gegenubertritt, das ist unser Herz, unser anderer
Selbst...'
23 A. Verdross, Die Einheit des rechtlichen Weltbildes auf Grundlage der Vdlkerrechtsverfassung
(The Unity of the Legal World...) (1923) at 1-2.
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relation to each other, in an original mutual boundedness as of the Whole to the
Parts.24 At this point Spann is introduced as having been taken to assert that the
universalist perspective is the only correct social theory and he cites Spann on the
place of the Volkstum as a member (died) of mankind (Menschheit).25
TO.. Verdross's Comments on Spann's Social Theory
After the publication of the Einheit Verdross wrote an extensive theoretical article in
which he gives central place to Spann.26 The argument of the article appears again
in Die Verfassung der Volkerrechtsgemeinschafi.21 Once again Verdross is
concerned with the nature of relationship, firstly at the individual-social level and
subsequently with the implications for international order. Kelsen and Spann are set
together as recognising that a meaningful unity28 can only be won from the
perspective of an objective order. The latter cannot arise out of the coming together
of independent units. These independent units must, somehow, already be members
of a meaningful order.29
The notion of objective value as meaningful, is opposed to subjectivist, i.e.
individualist, explanations of meaning in a way which clearly anticipates the
individual-collective assumption underlying Verdross's textbook concept of Volk in
1937. International law theory is being drawn from a primary social theory.
Verdross has, as seen above, claimed to develop an objective concept of the Volk in
which the individual is integrated, while the Volk itself is mid-way in an ascending
series of identification-producing relations. The key concept of universal also
appears in opposition to that of individual. These elements are taken from Spann in
the synthesis which Verdross makes of his thought in the Gesellschqftslehre. So it is
not the separate individual who is the starting-point but the universal totality/whole
of society {das universale Ganze der Gesellscha.fi). The individual can only be
understood as an offshoot of the totality (die Ausgliederung von Ganzheiten). A
decisive conclusion follows. The human being as such does not exist. For he is
always a member of a particular family, class, State, cultural world, and finally of
24 A. Verdross, Die Einheit..., supra note 23, at 41: 'fur welche Volkerrecht und Staaten in
urspriinglicher Aufeinanderbezogenheit stehen, wie das Ganze zu seinen Teilen, indem die Staaten
die Glieder dieser Einheit darstellen...'
25 Ibid.
26 Archiv fur Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie, Die gesellschaflswissenschaftlichen Grundlagen
der Volkerrechtstheorie, Vol. XVIII (1924/25) 413-431, reproduced in H. Klecatsky et al. (ed.).
Die Wiener rechtstheoretische Schule, Vol. II (1968) 2079.
27 [The Constitution of the International Law Community] (Springer Verlag, Wien-Berlin, 1926).
28 Einheit is a key word for Verdross.
29 Ibid., at 2080: '... denn nicht mehr darum kann es sich nun handeln, wie aus dem
Aufeinanderwirken von urspriinglich selbstandigen Einzelnen eine soziale Einheit entsteht,
sondem die Einzelnen werden in Wahrheit von vornherein als die Organe, als die Glieder einer
sinnvollen Ordnung betrachtet, da erst von diesen aus ihr Handeln gedeutet werden kann...'
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the Cosmos, but a human being never exists who was somehow never a member of
anything.30
In particular universalism expresses conceptually the centrality of relationship in
opposition to individualism.31
Verdross uses the universalist method to oppose a number of individualist
approaches to international law. Universalism will resist the ethno-centricity of the
Roman approach to treaty obligation which supposed that a community could only
bind itself in terms of its own values, as it was not integrated within a wider world
community.32 Yet it has to be seen that Verdross is, at the same time, aligning
himself with the conservative German Sonderweg against the English and French
Enlightenment. He connects his rejection of the idea that States can simply bind
themselves to one another through treaties with the idea that individuals can found
States through the instrument of a social contract, in fact the very basis of English
and French democratic liberalism.33 This very strong anti-individualist rhetoric is
the background to the assumption that it is not the treaty itself but the underlying
principle pacta sunt servanda which expresses the objective order which is prior to
the individual.34 The alternative is nothing but'... subjektivistisches Naturrecht...'^5
The decisive conclusion to Verdross's argument is that he speaks not of inter-
national law or legal order but of the constitution of the international law
community. Organic theory is central to the shaping of a particularly close
association of States in a single and distinctive community. Biological and cultural
metaphors abound, although they are more fully developed in the 1926 book. Two
States cannot deal directly with one another as two foreign beings (fremde Wesen)
but only through the incorporation of one under the other, so that it becomes a
member (Glied) of it, or both are subordinated (unterworfen/als Glieder einer ihnen
iibergeordneten Ganzheit)?6 A dichotomy is drawn between hegemonial relations
and relations of union (JEinheit/Universalitdt). The autonomous nation-State has no
place in Verdross's thinking. He is drawing on Spann for a theory of international
community. Autonomy on its own contains within itself a drive to hegemonial
30 Ibid., at 2080: '... Einen Menschen an sich gibt es also nicht. Denn er ist Glied einer bestimmten
Familie, Glied eines bestimmten Standes, Glied eines bestimmten Kulturkreises, Glied der
Menscbheit, endlich Glied des Kosmos, niemals aber Mensch, der nicht irgendwie Glied ware...'
31 Ibid., at 2081. Causality, individualism and empiricism are lumped together '... wahrend ihr
Widerpart, die universalistische Gesellschaftslehre, ihr innerlich nicht nur nicht entgegensteht,
sondern geradezu ihre Grundlage bilden will, da sie es sich ja zur Aufgabe gesetzt hat, das
Gesamlganze aller Teilganzen der Gesellschaft, darunter auch das Teilganze Recht, unter derselben
Einstellung, wie die Rechtstheorie, namlich als Ordnung von Normen grundsatzlich zu erfassen...'
32 Ibid., at 2082-3.
33 Ibid., at 2085. The doctrine of auto-limitation coming from Bergbohm and Jellinek "... ist der
getreue Abklatsch der zweiten Spielart des zwischenmenschlichen Individualismus, der den Staat
durch Vertrag zwischen den bisher unverbundenen Menschen entstehen laBt...'
34 Ibid., at 2085-6.
35 Ibid., at 2087.
36 Ibid., at 2090. In the Verfassung Verdross cites this article's argument virtually word for word, at
38, also 7-8:
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incorporation which can only be satisfied through world domination through a
single State. In an individualist perspective one State is drawn into the system of
another.37 The notion of a stable external public law (aufieres Staatsrecht) is
unrealistic because even this supposes that outside the State another State is
present.38
Drawing from Spann's Kategorienlehre (1924),39 Verdross's concept of
community has definite implications for acceptance into the community through
recognition. Thus, to recognize another State in a particular field means nothing
other than to regard it as a member of the same community. This is the meaning of
the primacy of the community of States.40 However, there is no explicitly
exclusivist concept of community intended here. Verdross highlights Spann's
acceptance, again drawing on the Gesellschaftslehre that the Volkstum is not the
final totality, but itself part of a higher totality, which is humankind.41 At the same
time, Verdross does not understand by humankind (Menschheit) a world State of
atomised individuals.42 There is a community of States. The individual State and the
community of States do not stand in opposition to each other as two foreign bodies
(Fremdkorper) whose wills clash in a power struggle. Verdross sees himself as
presenting a serious social theory of international relations, opposing, for instance, a
power politics theory. Hence it is important to assert the organic nature of the
relation of State to State community. The State community lives only in and through
its members, the States.43
At the same time, one might regard Verdross's theory as a type of 'metaphysical
decoration' for his equally held and more conventional view that international law
does not exist apart from States, that it has no organs of its own, that international
organs such as the League of Nations or the World Court are called into being by
States.44 Only States are the direct organs of international law. An international law
independent from State law (Staatsrecht) is impossible. However, Verdross regards
his organic theory as essential to overcome the idea that international law is
therefore unilaterally dependent on State law. Unity (Einheit) means 'members one
of the other'.45
37 Ibid., at 2090: "... dadurch wird aber der andere Teil zum Cliede dieses herabgedriickL..'
38 Ibid., "... wahrend der zum Gliede gewordene ehemals fremde Staat sich nicht mehr aufierhalb
sondem innerhalb des einzigen Staates befindet...'
39 O. Spann, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 6, Kategorienlehre, supra note 21 and infra note 80.
40 Ibid., at 2092: '... Einen anderen Staat in einem bestimmten Bereich anerkennen, heiBt so nichts
anderes, als sich mit ihm als Glieder derselben Gemeinschaft betrachten...'
41 Ibid., at 2093-4: '... das Volkstum keine letzte Ganzheit bildet, sondem selbst wiederum als Glied
hoherer Ganzheiten, letztlich der Menschheit erscheint...'
42 See above in his submission to the NS authorities his defence of his textbook as representing
objective rather than subjective nationalism, in the Gauakt (supra note 9).
43 Ibid., at 2094: '... vielmehr lebt die Staatengemeinschaft nur in ihren Gliedem, den Staaten...'
44 Ibid., at 2094-5.
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IV. Spann and 'Die Verfassung der Volkerrechtsgemeinschaft'46
In the Verfassung Verdross repeats these arguments, referring to and quoting from
Spann. Here it is intended not just to follow up these sources, but to highlight some
distinctive features. Verdross distinguishes himself from Kelsen in insisting that the
State cannot be dissolved (sich nicht auflosen) into the legal order. Legal Order and
Legal Community are inseparable but not reducible one to the other. For this
proposition Verdross relies directly on Spann. A positive order of legal norms is
valid only in relation to the actual conduct of a particular community. The idea of
the particularity of law in relation to concrete communities is implied.47 The
concept of Legal Community is developed in line with Spann's notion of
relationship and totality. Verdross adds a notion of the boundedness of every
individual man (Mensch) to God. Men are related to one another through a common
ground (Urgrund) so that they are not related to one another directly as separate
individuals but through a higher unity.48
The strength of the organic approach is that it does allow unity in difference
without the one entity having to be dissolved into the other. The autonomous
collective community is not a threat to international society precisely because it is
intimately integrated into it. Unity (Einheit) means not removal of but the
relativizing of difference (Vielheit in Einheit).49 It is worth stressing, however, that
relationship still has a homogeneous tendency, existing between those who are
related to the same community rather than foreign to one another.50
Nonetheless, in the legal context the concept of relatedness has a special
meaning and with respect to this, Verdross treats Kelsen and Spann as on the same
track, although Spann's doctrine of Ebenbildlichkeit is regarded as deeper than
Kelsen's pure theory of law. Foreignness and similarity have to do with the purity of
categories of thought, the distinguishing of intellectual disciplines. Some of
Verdross's (and Spann's) language which seems to come very close to the racial
expressions of National Socialism is in fact primarily concerned with avoiding
category mistakes in thought. Law is part of a legal totality, while politics,
economics, etc. are part of their own 'totalities'.51
45 Ibid., at 2095: '... Volkerrechtsverfassung und Staatsverfassung verhalten sich daher zueinander so,
wie der Makrokosmos zum Mikrokosmos, wie das Ganze zu seinen Gliedem...'
46 A. Verdross, Verfassung, supra note 27.
47 Verfassung, supra note 27, at 6-7. Verdross wishes to oppose this time-space structured notion of
law and community to Kelsen's apparently purely hypothetical, logical concept of law: see
especially at 22-23 later.
48 Ibid., at 7.
49 Ibid., at 38.
50 Ibid., at 8: '••• Eine Beziehung ist also nicht zwischen fremden sondern nur zwischen verwandten
d.h. solchen Gemeinschaften moglich, die sich als Ausgliederungen desselben umfassenden
Zusammenhanges darstellt...'
51 Die gesellschaftswissenschafilichen Grundlagen der Volkerrechtstheorie, supra note 26, at 2092:
'... Das Ganze wird in den Teilen nach der Weise seiner selbst geboren, was besagt, daB keine
Ganzheit ihrem Wesen nach Fremdes in sich enthalten kann. Alle ihre Glieder miissen ihres
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In the Verfassung this leads Verdross to draw a very sharp distinction between
his Spann-based theory of law and that of the Spanish school with which he is
otherwise deeply sympathetic, as was seen in the first mention of Spann in the
Einheit (above).52 Now Verdross insists against Suarez that international law cannot
be derived logically from moral (sittliche) norms but has to come about through the
experience of a consensus gentium.5* While natural law is necessary as a foundation
of international law, legal positivism is correct to insist upon methodological purity,
and law can only be effectively derived from higher legal norms.54 So the organic
theory of Spann is employed to support the mutual interaction of State and
international community as equal expressions of a unified legal world.55
Verdross identifies the political or ideological concerns of the Spanish school as
the same (i.e. as also concerned with achieving a unified legal world). So Vitoria
compares the individual State as pars totius orbis. It is not States but the State
community which is the logical first, the Totality which then divides itself up into
parts (as States).5^ Positive international law in the sense of law derived from State
will is clearly not enough to ground an international legal order. The principle pacta
sunt servanda has a different status as the form in which the relative independence
of States expresses itself in the organic whole of the universal international legal
community. Organic metaphors abound in the description of this principle.57 At the
same time, the concept of universalism taken from Spann expresses the nature of the
relationship of the State to the international legal community not within a
framework of intei-national law but uberstaatliches and ubernationales law.
Universalism places the central stress on relationship, which marks the integral
association of the part to the Totality, which in turn divides itself into parts. Here
Verdross reiterates the argument he had developed from Spann in his article;
between the Volker as individuals exists literally nothing, but over them - in the
sense of encompassing them - there is humanity (Menschheit) of which they are a
part and an expression.58
Verdross only partially carries over his theoretical discussions into his
examination of practical technical questions of international law. For instance,
Stammes, ihrer Art sein. Daher ist das Recht durch und durch rechtlich. Es besteht nur aus
rechtlichen Unterganzen... Jedes rechtliche Unterganze ... hat die Natur des ganzen Rechtes an
sick... Die Clieder miissen selbst das Ganze im Kleinen sein, Fleische vom Fleische des Ganzen...'
(italics in original).
52 See supra Part II.
53 Verfassung, supra note 27, at 26.
54 Ibid., at 28-29.
55 Ibid., again, at 38-39.
56 Ibid., at 39.
57 Ibid., at 40: '... Die Staatengemeinschaft selbst aber wird nicht erst durch das positive Volkerrecht,
sondern durch die Norm pacta sunt servanda begriindet. Sie bildet die Keimzelle der
Staatengesellschaft, die Urquelle des Volkerrechts. Schon sie stiftet eine, wenngleich nur der
Anlage nach wurzelhafte Verknupfung zwischen den Staaten, die nur der aktuellen Ausgestaltung
durch zwischenstaatliche Vereinbarungen ham...'
58 Ibid., at 40-41, a virtually word for word repetition of the argument of the article on the organic
relationship of State to international legal community.
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Verdross demonstrates his continued hostility to the social contract theory of the
State and connects this hostility with his unwillingness to accept that States can
simply bind themselves through treaties. International law cannot, therefore rest
upon a foundation of State consent alone. Bindingness is impossible without the
higher principle pacta sunt servanda.59 When Verdross comes to examine the
question whether there are international law rules on the origin of States and the
significance of the institution of recognition he gives a long account of State
practice on provinces breaking away from the 'mother' country. He concludes that
customary law takes over the idea that State organs are accepted by international
law when they are able to assert themselves internally and externally on territory.60
However, on recognition itself Verdross reasserts that a treaty cannot of itself create
duties of international law among States. The basic norm pacta sunt servanda makes
a treaty legally possible and the recognition-treaty then realizes it.61 The problem of
how recognition is possible as a mutual act unless each side is already an effective
legal actor is overcome by a notion of potentiality, completed in community.62 This
approach could have been more fully developed in terms of mutual recognition as
part of a process of incorporation in community, but Verdross does not undertake
this. Theory in his work largely comments on other theory rather than work itself
out in the details of international law. This is not, however, to downplay the
importance of theory in Verdross's vision of political society and international
relations.
V. The Political Background to Verdross's Theory of
International Law
What has been offered purports to be an exhaustive account of Verdross's use of the
thought of Othmar Spann. No speculation will be proffered as to why there is no use
made of Spann's thought in the lectures he gave one year later, entitled Le
fondement du droit international.^ Nor will it be asked why in his post-war
autobiographical contribution64 Verdross makes no mention of his article on Spann
as providing a supporting background to the Verfassung. Indeed no guess will be
made as to why Verdross does not cite Spann in his 1937 Volkerrecht at all. In the
present context uncertainty about Verdross's thought will be focused on the
relationship between his political Christianity and what is called here his romantic
nationalism. It is this combination which appears to have led to his suspension in
1938. They give a foundation for the claim that Verdross was not simply a technical
59 Verfassung, supra note 27, at 127-8.
60 Ibid, at 129-31.
61 Ibid., at 139.
62 Ibid., at 140:"... bereits im Augenblick ihrer Entstehung potentielle Volkerrechtssubjekte...'
63 16 RdC (1927 I) 251-321.
64 'Alfred Verdross', in N. Grass (ed.), Osterreichische Rechts- und Staatswissenschaften der
Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen (Innsbruck 1952) 201 at 205.
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international lawyer reproducing legal knowledge for students but also an engaged
intellectual concerned to shape German-Austrian political relations within a
community of European and Christian nations, as he understood these concepts. The
meaning or significance of Verdross's teaching and research in the university can be
best understood when they are seen in the light of his wider political activity. Indeed
it is this wider dimension of Verdross's life which led to his suspension from Vienna
University by the Nazis in 1938.
The most rapid introduction to Verdross's political engagement can be had by
considering a letter which he wrote to the Austrian Chancellor Schuschnigg on 6
March 1938 in which he called for an understanding between Christian political
elements and moderate National Socialists in Austria in order to avoid the complete
take-over of National Socialism by anti-Christian elements, such as was now the
case in Germany. The collectivist or corporativist and nationalist style of thinking of
Verdross seems unmistakable in the following passage of the letter. It assumes that
such collaboration in Austria might be possible:
...Wiirde es hingegen gelingen, in den volkspolitischen Referaten eine Zusammenarbeit
zwischen den gesamtdeutsch eingestellten christlichen Gruppen und den gemaBigten
Nationalsozialisten herbeizufiihren, dann besteht die Hoffnung, daB die christliche
Fiihrung in Osterreich dauemd gesichert bleibt. Auch dieser Weg ist gewiB nicht ohne
Gefahren, aber er scheint mir der einzige zu sein, der imstande ist, das Programm der
Maiverfassung: die Verschmelzung aller guten Osterreicher zu einem christlich-deutschen
Volk zu verwirklichen. Gleichzeitig aber wUrde ein solcher Erfolg die christlichen
Elemente im Deutschen Reich starken und auch dort eine Versohnung zwischen
Christentum und Nationalsozialismus vorbereiten helfen...65
It is the relationship between Christian political nationalism and National Socialism
in Verdross's thought and conduct which immensely intrigued the NS authorities
and left them sceptical about him but willing to accept him. In fact opinion was very
divided. One view from the Reichsfiihrer SS Office was that Verdross was a liberal
democrat and a Christian but willing to adapt to the new political circumstances.66
Another view, held by the leader of the NS Dozentenbund in Vienna University was
that Verdross had firmly corporativist Christian-German political views which he
65 Gauakt, supra note 9 translated by the author as follows: 'Were it, on the other hand, possible, to
bring about cooperation between the All-German {gesamtdeutsch) oriented Christian groups and
moderate National Socialists, then there would be hope that the Christian leadership remained
thereby assured in Austria. This approach is not without certain dangers, but it seems to me to be
the only way to achieve the programme of the May Constitution: the melting of all good Austrians
into a Christian German people. Such a success might strengthen Christian elements in Germany
itself where anti-Christian elements dominate within National Socialism.
66 See, for instance, in Gauakt No. 259658, supra note 9, the Report of SS Obersturmfuhrer MUllner,
24 August 1942 SD des Reichsfuhrers SS Wien (HI A 3 PA 527/38) which remarks '... ohne
jedoch eine feste bestimmte Grundhaltung einzunehmen, offenbaren seine zahlreichen auch
international anerkannten Schriften und Werke neben einer liberalen demokratischen Denkart
(Verdross war ein Schiller des nunmehr von ihm bekampften jiidischen Universitatsprofessors
Kelsen) eine starke christlich-philosophische Bindung... In charakterlicher Hinsicht ist er weich,
unentschlossen und wandelbar. Er versucht nunmehr den politischen Verhaltnissen gerecht zu
werden und sich ihnen anzupassen...'
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wished to use to shape National Socialism in a particular direction. This he had
failed to do, but he had to be watched carefully as his accommodation to existing
political realities was purely pragmatic.67
In this context it is believed that a brief exploration of Spann's own views, his
difficulties with National Socialism and critical reflection on these will help to
throw some light on Verdross's own position and perhaps even draw out some
concealed assumptions implicit in his international law theory. In particular, it is
intended to focus on the romantic aspect of Spann's thought and on his 'spiritual'
(geistige) nationalism. Given the understanding of these concepts which will be
offered here, it is clear that Verdross and Spann represent permanent features of
German political/legal culture which are very much alive in the Germany of today.
Nationalism as opposed to cosmopolitanism means that humanity expresses
itself through nations. A multiplicity in unity means that humanity divides itself up
into nations, which come together with one another in humanity. While Spann
firmly places humanity before the individual Volk (people) he does so only in the
sense that the Volk does not enjoy an independent existence, and not in the sense
that in whatever possible scale of values humanity is more important than the
nation. Indeed there is firm opposition to the alternative German tradition of the
world citizen and a deep disdain for the person who claims not to be attached to any
particular country.68 At the same time the community of Vb'lker is expressed in the
notion of the Christian, Western culture of Europe into which individual States are
compelled through treaties and other means to find their place as parts of a greater
whole.69 The notion of individuality has to be bound to relationship and not based
on autonomy.
Spann's theory has implications for the origin of States which, as already noted,
Verdross only partially adopts. The human spirit exists not in individual isolation
but in an unfolding mutuality {Gezweiung). The dimension of dialogue is central to
romantic nationalism. It is speech — being spoken to by the other — which awakens
the self. Meaning is found in exchange, in a mutual self-giving, where, of course,
individuality is enhanced rather than extinguished.70 Within a context in which the
67 Dozentenfiihrer der Universitat Gauleitung Wien (Dr. A. Marchet) 19 September 1942 Gauakt,
supra note 9: '... Er gehort jener katholisch-nationalen Zwischenschicht an, die fur uns
unerwiinscht isL..' Marchet attributes Verdross's suspension in 1938 to bis above cited letter,
which he interprets simply as an attempt to split the NSDAP so that a Christian leadership could be
maintained in Austria and strengthened in Germany. Verdross was rehabilitated because he was
able to persuade the authorities that his real intention was merely to help ward off the threat of civil
war in Austria. With Verdross rehabilitated, Marchet concludes that his present conduct is a
calculated conformism: '... DaB er nach dem Umbruch vorsichtig alles vermeidet, was ihn in
Schwierigkeiten bringen konnte, da8 er auch z.B. bei Sitzungen bemiiht ist, einen
nationalsoziahstischen Standpunkt zu vertreten, ist selbstverstandlich. Ebenso bin ich aber vollig
iiberzeugt, daB er kein unbedingter und verlaBlicher Nationalsozialist ist und sein kann'.
68 O. Spann, Gesellschaftslehre, supra note 21, at 568-570; see again Verdross, Volkerrecht, supra
note 1, at 39: '... Ein Mensch kann allerdings sein urspriingliches Volkstum verlieren, aber nur
dadurch, daB er sich in ein anderes, verwandtes Volkstum eingliedeit..'
69 Ibid., at 614.
70 Ibid., at 144- 149.
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primary models of human relationship are family and friendship71 Spann opposes
the founding of States in terms of an original contract in favour of the idea of a
reshaping of group relations, which have always to be seen as evolving, regrouping,
taking on an ever-changing variety of forms.72 A romantic concept of immediate
personal relations is thus treated as equally applicable to group relations even at an
international (correctly, universal) level.
However, Spann's understanding of the detail of the organization of a State is
authoritarian in the sense, opposed to democratic liberalism, that there are
considered to be objective values constituting society's meaning-structures and that
there are individuals and groups who arise within the society as best suited to
develop and apply these values. In such a context, law does not have the task of
guaranteeing the private freedom of the individual Rather, a good law is one which
reflects the fruitful and successful exchange of individuals in community.73 Popular
sovereignty in the French sense, with its accompanying idea of uniform, individual
equality is opposed by a concept of organic (here 'Stand') community in which each
individual has an 'appropriate' place.74 Spann puts it firmly:
... Die Sachsouveranitat tritt an die Stelle der Volkssouveranitat, Sachlichkeit an die Stelle
subjektiverWillkiir...'7*
There is a strong emphasis on the organization aspect of the State, its capacity to act
effectively. Neither Parliament, nor even civil servants provide the imaginative
organizational drive of the State, but a spontaneously evolving circle of experts.76
While it is usual to speak of several elements of the State (te^tory, population and
government) the essential element to stress is that of organization (organisierende
Handlung)?1 At the same time Spann considers the two aspects of his thought
compatible. The State constitutes the self-organising dimension of community. It is
embedded in relationships which he understands as organic. Hence it makes no
sense to continue to talk of superior-subordinate, or master-slave relationships,
given the common sense of community.78 Spann avoids any reification of the
group/society etc. as an independent totality. The totality is an ever-evolving system
or network of parts, in which the past as such has no merit. Rigidity, i.e. the attempt
71 Ibid., at 150.
72 Ibid., at 151: '... Hier geschieht keine Neugriindung eines Staates durch Vertrage Einzelner;
sondern was bier vorgeht, ist die Umgliederung gegebener staatlicher Wirklichkeit, weil aus einem
Staat ein Teil sich abzweigt...' This is Spann's way to describe the ending of the Russian and
Austrian-Hungarian Empires after 1917-18.
73 Ibid., at 584.
74 Ibid., at 586-594.
75 Ibid., at 596 (author's translation): "... A Competence Sovereignty steps into the place of popular
sovereignty, competence not subjective arbitrariness'.
76 Ibid., at 600. The Staatstragende Stand comes from a Sachverst&ndigenkreis, i.e. a circle of
professionally competent people.
77 Ibid., at 606.
78 Ibid., at 607-613.
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to hold an evolving process at a particular point in time, is the antithesis of an
organic perspective.79
Law, understood as an administrative expression of organizationalized social
behaviour, is accorded the autonomy which it must have if it is to fulfil its clear role.
At the same time, the confidence of the organic approach to social organization is
that effective organization presupposes that one does not confuse law, economy and
society.80 Once again it is not difficult to see how such a clear distinction between
disciplines could make Spann as appealing as Kelsen to Verdross in his own
intellectual development.
Spann supported the so-called Machtergreifung by the Nazis in Germany (30
January 1933) and made serious attempts to offer the Nazis academic and
intellectual support in Berlin. He offered blueprints of a corporativist State. While
he continued to be based in Austria the SS Leader Heydrich sought to recruit him.81
Nonetheless, a wide agreement exists that Spann was in no way a National Socialist
or a fascist. His work is not ambiguous. It is his behaviour which might be
characterized as naive and confused. The following critical reflections which have
been made about Spsrm appear to apply equally well to Verdross.
It is precisely the romantic features of Spann's thought which mark his
Weltfremdheit. The belief in a harmonious, objective, organic cultural identity of the
German people was in fact a radical subjectivism which Spann had in common with
the Nazis who equally tended to regard their own perspective as the only possible
one, to be carried through at all cost: Subjectivity equals Objectivity.82 Schneller
highlights how problematic the distinction is which both Spann and Verdross draw
between the subjective and the objective. As we have seen with Verdross,
objectivity is what distinguishes his German nationalism from individualist Western
European nationalism.83 Yet the weakness remains that for Spann and Verdross the
ideals or self-image which they hold are still the subjective impressions of a
collective. These impressions are supposedly objective simply because they are
collectively held. Nonetheless, what distinguishes Spann from National Socialism is,
firstly, the complete absence of racism and the explicit disregard for so-called
biological thought in his work. Secondly, Spann lacks any cult of violence,
79 Ibid., at 189-91.
80 O. Spann, Kaiegorienlehre, Gesamtausgabe. supra note 88, Vol. 6, taken from the 2nd edit. 1939,
at 113-118, 134.
81 M. Schneller, Zwischen Romantik und Faschismus, Der Beit rag Othmar Spanns zum
Konservatismus in der Weimarer Republik (1970), Ch. 6, at 143-164.
82 Schneller, supra note 81, at 159. The confused communality is summarized from an article written
by a contemporary, Use Roloff (Schneller, at 159): 'Die gemeinsame Basis wird gewonnen, indem
die voluntaristische Subjektivita't der nationalsozialistischen Bewegung mit der wissenschaftlichen
ObjekflvitSt der universalistischen Lehre verbunden wird. Danach heiBt Subjektivita't der Wille, die
eigene Auffassung als die einzig richtige durchzusetzen. Der subjektiv-kSmpferische Einsatz aber
geschieht fur eine objektive Idee, fur die schicksalhafte Mission des deutschen Volkes in der Welt
- folglich ist Subjektivitat gleich Objektivitat...'
83 Verdross's self-presentation, Cauakt, supra note 9.
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harshness or power.84 It should be recalled that for Verdross organic theory was
supposed to be the alternative to the power-politics (Machtdenken) of the Hegelian
school with particular reference to the work of Somlo. A craving for power and
violence has its root, in this organic perspective, in the alienation of individuals and
peoples from one another, not in their supposedly too close association with one
another. Communality of value minimizes, if it does not completely exclude, the
necessity of struggle for power, or whatever.
The most serious weakness of Spann (and Verdross) lies not in his faith in the
romantic magic of 'dialogic politics'85 but in the reactionary quality of his (and
Verdross's) political theology. The word reactionary simply means the belief that it
is a sufficient response to the ills of today to put the clock back to a previous time
when these ills were supposedly not present. As has been seen, Spann was aware of
this possible criticism, saw himself as having a progressive concept of time and
distinguished himself from those conservatives who, in his view, would attempt to
make time stand still.86 Nonetheless, the criticism is made that the politicizing of
religion makes of dogmatic Christianity an ethos of the State community. Such a
functionalizing of religion forgets that Christianity treated the individual and not the
community as eternal. Spann (and the so-called political Christians) constructed a
metaphysical fiction of social order rooted in a religious idea. The medieval world
was represented as anti-rational, while in fact the idealizing of the Middle Ages as a
harmony of Stande which could avoid contractual arrangements was historically
quite alien and an idealizing of collective egotism. This cult of medieval and then
Christian Western culture was a deeply reactionary response to the radical
individualization of modem industrial society which Spann hoped to sweep back
with his call to integrative cultural nationalism.87
The reactionary quality of political Christianity was in fact central to the
Austrian regime of 1934-38, similar to the authoritarian regimes in Portugal and
Spain. The Vatican, the Episcopate and Clergy of Austria stood relatively firmly
behind the regime.88 It wished to put the socio-economic clock back to an ideal
medieval Stande society where each knew his place. The social basis of this political
84 Schneller, supra note 81, at 169-171. From 1936 attacks from the SS Schwarze Korps and
Rosenberg concentrated on the lack of racial 'soundness' in Spann's thought and deplored his
spirituality (Geistigkeit) as an intellectual Neuscholastik. On the materialism of biological
reasoning, see Spann, Gesellschaftslehre, supra note 21, at 189-190. Verdross must have been
aware of how Spann was regarded by the Nazis at this time if he was watching the Party's advance
as acutely as Schonbauer claims.
85 After all this represents mainstream legal philosophy in Germany at present in the work of Jiirgen
Habermas and his call for zwangsfreie Diskussion as the foundation for legal and political life, e.g.
in Faktizitdt und Geltung (1992).
86 Gesellschaftslehre, supra note 21, at 189-191. In Spann's view his own organic social theory
implied a spirit of movement which was the very antithesis of the rigidity which he associated with
a conservative perspective.
87 Schneller, supra note 81, at 92-99.
88 Hanisch, 'Der Politische Katholizismus als ideologischer Trager des "Austrofaschismus"', in E.
Talos and W. Neugebauer (eds), Austrofaschismus (4th ed., 1988) 53, at 58, 60.
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Catholicism was among farmers, small business people and particularly, the
dominant civil service.89
This is very much Verdross's world. He draws upon Spann from the very outset
to reactivate the cultural power of a 16th century Spanish catholic intellectual
tradition which he sees threatened by modernist, Enlightenment individualism. He
states explicitly the need to bridge the cultural void created from the 16th century to
the appearance of thinkers such as Spann. The whole structure of the Verfassung is
built around this theme from pages 12 to 42. A criticism of 19th century positivism
is followed by a return to a review of classical international law with Suarez and
Grotius. The key argument after page 28 is about the renaissance of classical
international law, after its having been shaken by positivism. However, the logical
and hypothetical objectivity of Anzilotti and Kelsen had to be more firmly grounded
in objective values of the Cosmos (at page 31). This is found in Spann's social
theory which allows for a reworking of Spanish thinkers such as Vitoria (at pages 38
to 42).
Verdross's academic work can be seen in the context of his own complex
involvement in the Austrian politics of the 1930s. One very full account of his
activity at this time is offered by Ernst Schonbauer, the Dean of the Vienna Law
Faculty during Verdross's suspension. He states that from early 1934 Verdross
sympathized openly with National Socialism. In Schonbauer's view Verdross was
open in his opposition to the Schuschnigg regime and treated it as doomed from
about 1936. Verdross was enthusiastic about the Anschluss.90 This is what one
would expect from Verdross's call for unification in 1919. His letter to Schuschnigg
is dismissed by Schonbauer as not detracting from his sympathy with unification.
This is, of course, a vital part of the argument to have Verdross reinstated as a
professor. Thus, two members of Austrian political Catholicism identified with the
right wing deutsch-national action, Arthur Seyss-Inquart and Karl Gottfried
Hugelmann,91 are closely associated with Verdross.92 In other words, Verdross was
perfectly willing to stand up openly and be counted for political persons who were
in difficulty, even to the point of visiting one of them in prison.
89 Ibid., at 66: '... unter der Beamtendominanz - besonders stark ausgebildet, hielten sich standische
Verhaltensmuster besonders lange...'
90 Report of Ernst Schonbauer to Reichskommissar fur die Wiedervereinigung, Vienna 14 February
1939 given by Prof. E. Rabofsky to Univ. Doz. Dr. Oliver Rathkolb with the note, 'Die Kopien
Eibl und Schonbauer sind von Abschriften hergestellt worden, die ich 1945 anfertigen lieS. Die
Originate mussen sich bei der Stapo (Staatspolizei, Anm.) befinden, fur die Transkripte des
Inhaltes verbiirge ich mich. E. Rabofsky'. Schonbauer's aim, as Dean, is to keep in the Faculty a
colleague whom he regards as an outstanding teacher and scholar. His view of the suspension was
that it was part of an intrigue by much less qualified Nazis to take Verdross's position.
91 See also Hanisch, supra note 88, at 55.
92 Schonbauer, supra note 90. That is to say Verdross was impressed by the former as national und
katholisch and yet able to win Hitler's confidence, so this belief led him to speculate in his letter to
Schuschnigg about a reconciliation with the possibility of a ministry for himself. Schonbauer
praises Verdross's courage for visiting Hugelmann in prison when he was arrested after 25 July
1934, speaking out very openly for him.
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Schonbauer accuses Verdross of opportunism, of moving all the way from neo-
Kantian support of Kelsen in the early 1920s to a marked conservative nationalism
in the mid-1930s.93 However, it remains difficult to decide about charges of
opportunism when they come from those committed to a fanatical movement and
are faced with others willing to cooperate up to a point but definitely in possession
of their own agenda. For instance, on one occasion Schonbauer notes how Verdross
shared a common political platform with DollfuB, but avoided any political
comment. Schbnbauer remarks that Verdross spoke only of the Christian community
of nations in Europe.94 For Verdross, the Christian Europe of Nations included the
Germans as a single nation. The Nazi authorities accepted Schonbauer's arguments,
but reinstated Verdross without allowing him to continue teaching his Christian-
based philosophy of law.95 .
How remote the world of Spann and Verdross was from the ethos of the survival
of the fittest (social Darwinism) of National Socialism is stressed by numerous
authors such as Hanisch, Schneller and Johnston. Hanisch highlights with respect to
Austrian political Catholicism in the 1930s a longing for social harmony and
freedom from conflict. This led to a desire to replace a social Darwinist struggle for
life with a supposedly natural, harmonious society. As Hanisch puts it:
Organische, naturrechtliche Gesellschaft heiBt: daB die sozialen Hierarchien geachtet
werden...9^
The movement expressed not a pure ideological manipulation but deep-lying dreams
and longings (Trdume und Sehnsiichte), marking an inability to tackle conflict and a
craving for harmony to escape the social tensions of an increasingly fragmented
society.97 In other words, despite the effective crushing of an autonomous labour
movement, and an intense anxiety in the face of Bolshevism, this movement of
political thought and activity retained a quality of Schonheitsdenken which made it
an unequal partner for National Socialism.98
93 Schonbauer, supra note 89.
94 Ibid.'... Zwar trat er noch 1933 als Redner zusammen mit DollfuB bei dem groBen Katholikentage
auf, aber er vermied dabei jede pplitische AuBerung und sprach nur liber die christliche
Velkergemeinschaft Europas...' This is also part of Sch6nbauer's strategy to distance Verdross
from the Austrian regime.
95 Schonbauer was a scholar in his own right Although a convinced NS party member he did not. as
a Roman law scholar, simply take the party line that Roman law encouraged only individualism
and had no communitarian dimension, see Stolleis, '"Fortschritte der Rechtsgeschichte" in der Zeit
des Nationalsozialismus?', in M. Stolleis, Recht im Unrecht, Studien zur Rechtsgeschichte des
Nationalsozialismus (1994) 77 et seq.
96 Hanisch, in Talos et al., supra note 88, at 67: '... organic-natural law society means that the social
hierarchies are observed' (translation by the author).
97 Ibid.
98 For a similar assessment of Spann, see W.J. Johnston, dsterreichische Kultur- und
Geistesgeschichte. Gesellschaft und Ideen im Donauraum 1848-1938 (3rd ed., 1992) 313-317.
Johnston rejects Karl Polanyi's charge of fascism against Spann, made in the 1930s, that Spann
had constructed a totalitarian society which would sacrifice the individual. Johnston's criticism is
nonetheless severe that thinkers such as Spann took the study of intellectual history as a substitute
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One final criticism which was made of Spann should also apply to Verdross.
Spann took the study of the history of ideas as a substitute for a political reality
which it served to hide." Without a full analysis of the 1937 textbook it is difficult
to make the same criticism of Verdross. However, it has already been noted, with
respect to the Verfassung, that Verdross does not carry through the implications of
his Spann-based theory systematically for the whole of his text. It requires at least as
much historical and historiographical research as has been undertaken here to track
down what Verdross could have understood the significance of Spann to be. In this
sense there is not a direct interaction in his work between his theoretical, and his
practical interests. For instance, he uses Spann as a more effective tool to refute
legal positivism than either Kelsen or Suarez. It is possible that the relative decline
of interest in theory in more pragmatic post-1945 times is attributable to this
tendency of pre-war theory to obscure erudition - which it has been one of the aims
of this article to unravel.
VI. Postscript on Post-war Germany and Organic Legal Theory
Organic thinking does not have a good name in post-war Germany. It is taken to be
one of the cardinal marks of Organologie that it seeks innumerable metaphors of the
State as family as plant, as totality and as person, to harken back to more perfect,
harmonious pre-modern times. It is thoroughly discredited in a now dominant
modernist German political and legal thinking. Modernist refers to the present-day
overwhelming West German acceptance of the virtues of the 17th and 18th century
political and social Enlightenment in England and France. Habermas and Luhmann
are taken to be the leading German social theorists who so understand themselves.
Both have made comprehensive statements on legal theory. However, the question
might be asked whether there are traces of Organologie in the thought of Luhmann.
Nonetheless, it can be said that at present there is no place for organic thinking in
mainstream German public law theory. This has been characterized as one of the
dilemmas of German conservatism.' °°
for political reality and accepted no responsibility for the interpretations which might be put on
their work. In fact, however, the unfortunate Spann's only achievement - the Nazis never reinstated
him and he failed after 1945 to be reinstated -, was in Johnston's words '... daB er eine so gut wie
verlorene Tradition wieder zustande brachte...'
99 Johnston, supra note 98, at 316.
100 M. Greiffenhagen, Das Dilemma des Konservatismus in Deutschland (1986) Chapter 10
Organologie, 200-218, esp. at 202-203 for legal literature, and at 216-216 for the concept of
Totalitdt and the work of Othmar Spann. It will be interesting to explore whether there are,
nonetheless, organic traces in the legal-social theory of N. Luhmann. His latest legal work Das
Recht der Gesellschaft (1993) differs very little in style from Spann's Gesellschaftslehre except for
his conviction that there is no centre holding social groups together. His legal theory is, in terms of
the relation of law to other disciplines, merely a repetition of that developed by Spann and taken up
by Verdross. Law is a completely autonomous meaning-world of its own which relates to the non-
legal entirely in terms of accepting and rejecting the outside - the non-law - within its own
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At the same time brief mention might be made of the following points..It is of
interest that the two thinkers considered here both opposed a model of the nation-
State as being essentially autonomous in its relations with other nation-States. The
States of Europe (Christian and Western Europe) had to be integrally united in a
wider (international) community. Unity (Einheit) is the key word for Verdross.
Totality (das Ganze) was the key word for Spann. Secondly, both retained the
romantic ideal that political life was a conversation. As Spann puts it
... Du hast Neues in mir geschaffen wie die Worte der Sprache erst durch die
Mitbedeutungen der anderen Worte einen Sinn erhalten...'^1
Finally, more clearly for Spann than for Verdross, politics should remain in the
hands of the 'competent' (die Sachsouveranitat tritt an die Stelle der
Volkssouveranitat). It is a commonplace of German public debate that
Sachkompetenz has, mercifully, replaced the grand ideological debates (for instance
between Kelsen and Schmitt) of the inter-war period. These three elements in the
thought and concerns of Othmar Spann and Alfred Verdross are still very prominent
indeed in contemporary German political and legal culture.
meaning-structures. Both Spann and Luhmann come up with the irritating definition 'Law is Law',
meaning it is not something else!
101 Cesellschaftslehre, supra note 21, at 144 (author's translation): '... You have created something
new in me just as the words of a language take on new meaning through being related to one
another...'
97
